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NOTES
North Carolina's Ridge Law: No View From the Top
North Carolina's mountains have long been a getaway retreat, valued for
their breathtaking views, recreational opportunities, and "away-from-it-all"
atmosphere. Recently, however, the mountains have attracted a growing
number of tourists and second-home buyers from outside of the region,'
spawning a construction boom that has threatened these attractions.2 The
likely impacts of this boom 3 and the possibilities of regulating development
have been subjects of controversy among local residents, vacationers, develop-
ers, and state and local lawmakers. The controversy climaxed in the winter of
1982-83 with the construction of a stark ten-story condominium atop one of
the region's tallest peaks.
In response to this controversial construction, the North Carolina General
Assembly enacted the Mountain Ridge Protection Act5 in July, 1983 to pre-
serve the natural beauty and inherent attractiveness of the mountains. 6 This
legislation may be viewed as a step toward the enactment of statewide land-
use controls, and therefore raises several issues regarding the limits of state
and local governmental powers. After a brief discussion of the Act's legisla-
tive background, this Note will focus on the Act's significance as a method of
state-level regulation and discuss its implications on local autonomy. Finally,
the Note will analyze potential constitutional challenges to the Act.
In 1982, after leveling the peak of Little Sugar Mountain in Avery
County, an out-of-state developer commenced construction of Sugar Top, a
ten-story condominium. Billing Sugar Top as "one of the most extraordinary
structures in the United States, ' 7 the developer sold seventy-five percent of the
1. Durham Sun, Apr. 4, 1983, at 6C, col. 4. From 1970 to 1980 newcomers comprised 70%
of the population growth in the 15 westernmost counties of North Carolina. The statewide aver-
age was 50%. During the same period, the amount of acreage used for agriculture decreased in the
mountain counties three times faster than in the state as a whole, and even faster when compared
to the State's nonmountain regions. Id.
2. Charlotte Observer, Jan. 23, 1983, at ID, col. 2. In 1982 over 600 houses and condomini-
ums were sold in the 10 square mile ski resort belt of Avery and Watauga counties. Id.
3. Although some people argue that the construction boom will create jobs in the area and
attract more tourists, others believe that the boom's long-term effect will be to ruin the area's
natural attractiveness and discourage vacationers. See Durham Sun, May 12, 1983, at 4C, col. 1;
Charlotte Observer, supra note 2.
4. See generally, Durham Sun, supra note 1; Fayetteville Observer, Mar. 7, 1983, at 13A, col.
1 (Ist ed.); Charlotte Observer, supra note 2.
5. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 177 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-205 to -214
(1983)).
6. Id.
7. Charlotte Observer, supra note 2 (quoting Don Tomlin, President of U.S. Capital Corp.).
Sugar Top is a 741,000 square foot structure of concrete, glass, and steel. The estimated construc-
tion cost was $22 million. The developer, U.S. Capital Corporation, has worked primarily in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, Hilton Head, South Carolina, and Gulf Shores, Alabama. Id.
U.S. Capital's president, Don Tomlin, stated: "From a purely aesthetic point of view [Sugar Top]
is a magnificent presence. The people (who have bought units) think it's beautiful." Id.
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three hundred twenty units before the scheduled completion date.8 The pur-
chasers, many of whom were second-home buyers from Florida,9 paid be-
tween $115,000 and $150,000 for each unit.'0 In addition to its attractiveness
as a vacation resort, the development promised an economic boost to a de-
pressed area of the State.
1'
Local residents, however, viewed Sugar Top as a symbol of external ex-
ploitation of their land, "motivat[ing] property owners, politicians, state offi-
cials and even other developers to see that it [would] never happen again."'
2
In mid-March of 1983 the State legislature began considering bills that would
give municipal and county officials a choice between accepting state-imposed
construction height restrictions on mountain ridges and adopting their own
restrictions.' 3 The House bill provided localities the additional option of not
adopting any restrictions, the sponsors apparently recognizing the widespread
sentiment that construction restrictions were a matter of local prerogative re-
quiring minimal state involvement,' 4 and that some local governments might
welcome increased development. The bill was supported by mountain resi-
dents, local governments, and environmental groups, and opposed by develop-
ers, builders, and landowners.' 5 After months of debate, the legislature
ratified the amended bill on July 5, 1983.
The Mountain Ridge Protection Act ("Ridge Law") provides several op-
tions for regulating the construction of "tall buildings"'16 on "protected moun-
8. Id
9. Fayetteville Observer, supra note 4.
10. Charlotte Observer, supra note 2.
11. Sugar Top and 2 low-rise resorts on Sugar and Beech mountains promised an increased
tax base and the creation of 350 jobs. Id
12. Id In response to the construction of Sugar Top, the North Carolina Sierra Club
adopted a resolution on January 8, 1983, urging state support for land-use planning which would
ensure that development projects would be compatible with the local environment and values.
The Club's Blue Ridge group made mountain ridge protection its highest priority in 1983. Id
Also in response to Sugar Top, the Commissioners of Watauga and Avery counties approved
moratoria on construction of high-rise buildings. Winston-Salem J., Mar. 20, 1983, at IB, col. 1.
For additional local responses, see Fayetteville Observer, supra note 4; Charlotte Observer, supra
note 2.
13. Winston-Salem J., supra note 12; Office of State Management Systems, Bill History as of
7/22/83 (available in North Carolina Law Review Office) [hereinafter cited as Bill History]. For
the full series of draft bills, see S. 188, 1983 N.C. Sess. (eds. 1-7) (available in the North Carolina
Law Review Office); H.R. 438, 1983 N.C. Sess. (available in Institute of Government Library,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
14. Winston-Salem J., supra note 12.
15. Durham Sun, supra note 3. The most controversial provisions concerned local exemp-
tion, civil remedies, elevations, and building height restrictions. See generally Durham Morning
Herald, June 18, 1983, at 3A, col. 1; Durham Morning Herald, May 12, 1983, at 4C, ol. 1; Dur-
ham Morning Herald, Apr. 14, 1983, at 6D, col. I; Winston-Salem J., supra note 12; Charlotte
Observer, supra note 2; Bill History, supra note 13. For a legislative history of the Ridge Law, see
Heath, The North Carolina Mountain Ridge Protection Act, 63 N.C.L. REv. 183 (1984).
16. The Act defines "tall buildings" as,
any building, structure or unit within a multiunit building with a vertical height of more
than 40 feet measured from the top of the foundation of said building, structure or unit
and the uppermost point of said building, structure or unit; ... provided, further, that
no such building, structure, or unit shall protrude at its uppermost point above the crest
of the ridge by more than 35 feet. "Tall buildings or structures" do not include:
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tain ridges"1 7 in twenty-four counties. 18 One option allowed the locality to
adopt an ordinance requiring developers to acquire a permit before construct-
ing tall buildings on protected ridges. 19 Before passing an ordinance, how-
ever, a county must have conducted studies of the ridges, articulated objectives
for the ordinance, considered plans for achieving those objectives, and con-
ducted a public hearing.20 For counties that failed to adopt an ordinance by
January 1, 1984, the second option-total prohibition of tall buildings on "pro-
tected mountain ridges"-automatically took effect.2 ' A third option allowed
counties to pass more restrictive ordinances, covering construction on all
ridges more than 500 feet above the adjacent valley floor,22 or on other ridges
reasonably needing protection "against some or all of the hazards or problems
set forth in G.S. 113A-207['s legislative findings]."' 23 This option also enabled
a. Water, radio, telephone or television towers or any equipment for the transmission
of electricity or communications or both.
b. Structures of a relatively slender nature and minor vertical projections of a parent
building, including chimneys, flagpoles, flues, spires, steeples, belfries, cupolas, antennas,
poles, wires, or windmills.
c. Buildings and structures designated as National Historic Sites on the National
Archives Registry.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-206(3) (1983).
17. The Act defines "ridge" to include all land within 100 feet of any portion of the crest of a
mountain. Id. § 113A-206(5). "Protected mountain ridges" are defined as "all mountain ridges
whose elevation is 3000 feet and whose elevation is 500 or more feet above the elevation of an
adjacent valley floor." Id. § 113A-206(6).
18. Telephone interview with Mark Sullivan, Planner, Division of Land Resources, North
Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (Nov. 9, 1983) [herein-
after cited as Sullivan Interview]. Because of the Act's definition of "protected mountain ridges,"
only the 24 counties containing protected ridges are subject to the Act. The counties with pro-
tected ridges are Alleghany, Ashe, Avery, Buncombe, Burke, Caldwell, Cherokee, Clay, Graham,
Haywood, Henderson, Jackson, Macon, Madison, McDowell, Mitchell, Polk, Rutherford, Surry,
Swain, Transylvania, Watauga, Wilkes, and Yancey. All cities in those counties also are covered
by the Act. M. Heath, Questions and Answers on the North Carolina Ridge Protection Law of
1983, at Question 3 (July, 1983) (available in Institute of Government Library, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
Counties and cities are given virtually identical powers by North Carolina planning and de-
velopment legislation. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (1983) ("[Flor the purpose of pro-
moting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare a county may regulate and restrict, (1) the
height, number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures .... ") with id. § 160A-381
(1982) ("[Flor the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the com-
munity, a city is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size
of buildings and other structures .... ")
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-208 (1983). To receive a permit under the Act, an applicant
must provide for adequate sewer systems, water supply systems, and sedimentation control, and
give adequate consideration "to protecting the natural beauty of the mountains, as determined by
the local governing body." Id Conditions may be added to the permit to ensure proper opera-
tion, mitigation of recognized problems, protection of natural areas or public health, and well-
designed, safe, and appropriate construction. Id § 113A-208(c).
20. Id. § l13A-208(a), (f).
21. Id § 113A-209.
22. Id. § 113A-208(a). The third option allowed a local government to ignore the 3000 foot
elevation requirement in the definition of protected ridges. Id § 113A-206(6).
23. Id § 113A-208(d). The legislature found that "tall or major buildings and structures on
the ridges and higher elevations of North Carolina's mountains constructed in an inappropriate or
badly designed manner can cause unusual problems and hazards to the residents of and visitors to
the mountains." Id § 113A-207. The commonly cited problems included provision of water and
sewer service, fire protection, vulnerability to high winds, interference with navigation, and de-
traction from the natural beauty of the mountains. Id
1984]
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eleven additional counties to include themselves within the Act's restrictions.24
Finally, a city or county could have "opted-out" of the Act's coverage by con-
ducting a referendum on or before May 8, 1984.25 A county or city that
"opted-out" could later decide to "opt-in" by conducting a similar referendum
before May 13, 1986.26
The Ridge Law is the legislature's first step toward land-use control in the
mountains and only its second enactment of regional land-use controls in the
State. Thus, the Ridge Law may "pave the way for the first comprehensive
land protection planning in the North Carolina mountains,"27 or in the State
as a whole. In addition, the Ridge Law represents the first state-level imposi-
tion of land-use restrictions for primarily aesthetic purposes.28 Although the
24. M. Heath, supra note 18, at Question 4. The additional counties are Alexander, Catawba,
Cleveland, Davidson, Gaston, Iredell, Montgomery, Randolph, Stanley, Stokes, and Yadkin. Id
25. N.C. GE. STAT. § 113A-214(a) (1983).
26. Id § 113A-214(b).
27. Charlotte Observer, supra note 2. Legislation for a comprehensive mountain area man-
agement act (MAMA) was introduced during the 1974 and 1975 terms, but never was enacted.
The Institute of Government, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Legislation 1975.- A Summary of Legirlation in the 1975 General Assembly ofInterest to North
Carolina Public Officials 123 (1975) (S. 973, H.R. 1379, 1973-74 N.C. Legislature were rejected and
S. 467, H.R. 596, 1975 N.C. Sess. were left in committee) [hereinafter cited as North Carolina
Legislation 197)]. The proposed legislation would have established a comprehensive state and
local program, requiring local planning in accordance with state guidelines and state review of
development permits for identified areas ofenvironmental concern. Ifa county chose not to adopt
a plan, the State would have devised a plan for that particular county. After mixed public support
for MAMA at public hearings in Asheville and Raleigh, supporters decided not to push the bill
"in hopes of finding a more favorable legislative environment in 1977." North Carolina Leglsla-
tion 1975, supra. The bill never was reintroduced.
Despite the State's limited involvement under the Ridge Law, some are convinced that the
Ridge Law will lead to broad-scale, regional, land-use planning. "It's like the first step we made
on the coast. We got into dune protection and dredge-and-fill (laws), and that led to CAMA."
Charlotte Observer, supra note 2 (quoting Joe Grimsley, Secretary of North Carolina Dep't of
Natural Resources and Community Development).
28. Historically, the State has allowed local governments to restrict land uses for aesthetic
purposes, notably by the creation of historic preservation districts and commissions, See Infra
notes 95-97 and accompanying text; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-395 to -399.13 (1982). State-level
participation in historic preservation, however, does not go beyond maintaining a survey of his-
toric properties, creating policies for historic preservation, and providing technical assistance to
local governments. Id § 121-8 (1981 & Supp. 1983). Other state-level aesthetic controls, such as
the prohibition of billboards, are nonexistent.
Most state-level land-use controls in other jurisdictions focus on environmental problems--
the protection of wetlands or floodplains or the preservation of agricultural land-that transcend
municipal or county boundaries. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW ch. 12 (1982). See also
CAL. PUn. RES. CODE §§ 22000 to 22080 (West 1977) (commission established to protect the Ven-
tura-Los Angeles Mountain and Coastal Zone); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-210 to -312 (1981 &
Supp. 1983) (coastal wetland statute); IowA CODE ANN. § 455B.276 (West Supp. 1983) (floodplain
regulation statute); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 3301-3306A (1979 & Supp. 1983) (statewide
comprehensive planning for "human and physical resource development and utilization," capital
improvements and intergovernmental coordination planning, as an addition to municipal plan-
ning powers); Id at tit. 5, §§ 3310-3314 (state register of critical areas to be specially considered in
state planning activities); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 422-B:1 to :18 (1983) (permits for construction
of structures in territory surrounding public airports that is not locally zoned); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:9A-1 to :10 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983) (coastal wetland statute); OR. REv. STAT. § 197.405 to
.430 (1983) (designation of areas of critical state concern in which certain developmental activities
are prohibited or regulated); 19 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 801-805 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (state
control over Appalachian Trail to supercede local planning and zoning); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6001-6092 (1973 & Supp. 1983) (permit from one of nine district commissions required for
construction of large developments and for other development in specified environmentally sensi-
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legislative findings suggest other justifications for the building height restric-
tions,2 9 the Act's primary concern is preserving the scenic beauty of the
mountains.
30
Land-use planning and zoning traditionally have been handled at the lo-
cal level,31 with minimal interference or guidance by the state. More recently,
however, many states have recognized that some land-use problems transcend
local boundaries and are controllable only at the regional or state level. These
states are beginning to reclaim some of the zoning and land-use powers previ-
ously granted to the cities and counties.
32
Despite this activity in other states, North Carolina has had very limited
involvement in land-use and development controls, at least outside of the
coastal zone. Particularly in the mountain region, residents have resisted
state-imposed, comprehensive planning on at least two occasions.33 Whether
the local resistance is derived from a fear that land development controls
would prevent economic development, a disdain for the impositions on free-
dom involved in any kind of land-use control, or a general distrust of state
government, the residents have legitimate concerns over the land on which
they live and, less often, own.34 Any attempt to regulate land use in the region
must consider these concerns.
Before passing the Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) 35 and the
tive area--comprehensive statewide plan to supplement local planning); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 87.30-.31 (West 1972 & Supp. 1983) (floodplain regulation statute).
29. See supra note 23.
30. Public reaction to Sugar Top indicates that the main concern was spoliation of mountain
scenery. Durham Sun, supra note 3. One lifetime resident of Norwood Hollow, a small town
located at the foot of Sugar Mountain, stated: "I hated to see the ski slopes come in, but it didn't
bother me as much [as Sugar Top] because they didn't change the shape of things.. . . [tihat
thing'll be seen for miles and miles." Charlotte Observer, supra note 2 (quoting Claude Nor-
wood). One argument for imposing controls at the state level was the visibility of mountaintops
from adjacent counties. Durham Morning Herald, May 12, 1983, at 4C, col. 1. One representa-
tive of the North Carolina General Assembly said that the height restriction was intended to allow
one to "stand in the valley floor, look up and see the crest." Durham Morning Herald, June 18,
1983, at 3A, col. I (quoting Rep. Joe Mavretic). Although the legislature mentioned health and
safety considerations, see supra note 23, as support for the Act, the correlation between these
justifications and building height is attenuated; for example, pumping water or driving a firetruck
up a mountain present the same difficulties whether a building is 100 or 200 feet tall.
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-340 (1983); id. § 160A-381 (1982).
32. See supra note 28.
33. In 1974 residents resisted comprehensive mountain area management. See supra note 27.
The Ridge Law also has met local resistance. Telephone interview with Milton Heath, Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Oct. 24, 1983 [hereinafter cited as
Heath Interview]. Professor Heath has indicated that a major difference between the Coastal Area
Management Act (CAMA) and the mountain legislation is that the people influencing the moun-
tain legislation emphasized local control, trying to keep the State as uninvolved as possible. Id.
Under the Ridge Law, the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development pro-
vides only supplementary assistance to local governments. The State is required to map out the
"protected mountain ridges;" beyond this administrative function, the State provides assistance
only upon request. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-212 (1983).
34. See Durham Sun, supra note 1. "The biggest problem is the local people do not control
their county. And that's a pathetic thing." Id (quoting Cloyd Bolick, local landowner and life-
time resident). Absentee owners in 9 Western counties control at least 48% of the land; in Swain
County, outside individuals, corporations, and government agencies control 94% of the land. Id
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-100 to -128 (1983).
1984]
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Land Policy Act of 1974,36 North Carolina adopted a "hands-off" approach to
land-use regulation. The Land Policy Act, however, recognized a state role in
planning and offered planning assistance to all local governments that re-
quested it.37 CAMA, on the other hand, recognized that land-use laws might
need to go beyond their traditional role of mediating "between conflicting uses
of land and [providing] for physical development" and protect "the environ-
mental integrity and productivity of land as a limited resource. 38 Because
environmental problems transcend county boundaries and make it impossible
for a single county or municipality to combat them effectively, North Carolina
adopted a comprehensive system of planning for the twenty counties within
the coastal region.
39
CAMA illustrates a growing tendency among environmentally-concerned
states to protect areas of critical state interest by regulating development at the
36. Id §§ 113A-150 to -159.
37. Id.
38. Schoenbaum, The Management of Landand Water Use in the Coastal Zone:A New Law Is
Enacted in North Carolina, 53 N.C.L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1974). For a discussion of early state
land-use controls, see F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CON-
TROL (1971).
39. CAMA resulted from concern about the coastal ecosystem's deterioration, which had
been caused primarily by the pollution of estuarine waters, the filling of salt marshes, and the
destruction of dunes and maritime forests. Schoenbaum, supra note 38, at 276; see also Rice,
Estuarine Lands of North Carolina: LegalAspect of Ownership, Use and Control, 46 N.C.L. REV,
779 (1968); Comment, Estuarine Pollution: The Deterioration ofthe Oyster Industry in North Caro-
lina, 49 N.C.L. REV. 921, 922 (1971); R. Bode & W. Farthing, Coastal Area Management in North
Carolina: Problems and Alternatives, 4-6 (Feb. 11, 1974) (available at the N.C. Law Center).
Designated CAMA counties must adopt land-use plans in accordance with state guidelines; if
a county fails to produce a plan, the State will impose one. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1 13A-106 to -112
(1983). Before commencing any development involving construction, dredge or fill operations, or
land alteration in state-designated "area[s] of environmental concern," a developer must procure a
permit. Id § 113A-1 18. For a "major development"-a development that requires approval from
another state or federal agency, occupies an area greater than 20 acres, contemplates drilling for or
evacuation of natural resources, or occupies a large structure, id § 113A-1 18(d)(l)-the Coastal
Resources Commission must allow a period for interested parties and other state agencies to com-
ment on the application before granting a permit. Id § 113A-1 19, Permission for a "minor devel-
opment"-a development other than a "major development," id § 113A-l18(d)(2)-is
administered locally. Id. § 113A-121. The Act prescribes when permits are to be granted or de-
nied, id. § 113A-120, and how appeals are to be handled, id §§ 113A-121.1 to -123.
By dividing authority between the state and the local governments, North Carolina became a
leader in allowing greater local participation in coastal zone management. Schoenbaum, supra
note 38, at 283, 292 (many other states use local governments merely as administrators of state
programs or directives, rather than as active participants in the process). New York, for example,
binds local governments with state-adopted land-use regulations. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 51-0701 to -0713 (McKinney Supp. 1983). Until 1976 California did not require local govern-
ment plans to include coastal considerations. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30103 (Deering 1977). See
D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION, 246-54 (1976 & Supp.
1978).
For discussion and comparison of state statutory frameworks for coastal zone mangement,
see D. MANDELKER, supra, ch. VI; Ausness, Land Use Controls in CoastalAreas, 9 CAL. W.L. REV.
391, 404-13 (1973); Bryden, The Impact of Variances: A Study of Statewide Zoning, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 769 (1977) (administration of Minnesota Shoreland Management Act); Note, Assimilating
Human Activity into the Shoreland Environment: The Michigan Shoreland Protection and Manage-
ment Act of 1970, 62 IowA L. REV. 149 (1976); Note, State Land Use Regulation-A Survey of
Recent Legislative Approaches, 56 MINN. L. REV. 869, 889-911 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note,
State Land Use Regulation Survey]; Note, The Wetlands Controversy: A Coastal Concern Washes
Inland, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1015 (1977).
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state level.40 Although the federal Coastal Zone Management Act41 provided
incentives for state protection of coastal regions, some states have protected
other areas without direct federal incentive. New York, for example, has en-
acted a "comprehensive" zoning42 plan to regulate the development of both
public and private lands in its six-million acre Adirondack Park.43 New
Jersey has preempted local control of its Hackensack Meadowlands by creat-
ing a special agency to oversee the area's development and protection."4
Other states use varying schemes to retain control over development in
the entire state or in special areas to be designated throughout the state.45 In
40. Most states have enacted selective protective measures aimed at portions of the state,
rather than comprehensive state regulation. Most often, the legislation designates areas of critical
concern for which the state either establishes developmental guidelines for local governments or
requires a state development permit. See generally MODEL LAND Dav. CODE §§ 281-288 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1975); R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES (2d ed. 1979);
R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE STATES AND LAND-USE CONTROL (1975); D.
MANDELKER, supra note 39, at ch. III (comparison of the ALI Model Code and the legislation
currently in effect); D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1207-70 (1979); Callies, Land Use and CriticalAreas:
Preservation and Development Compromise in England andAustralia, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 265
(1979) (comparison of foreign innovation in regional or national land development controls); Pel-
ham, Regulatory Areas of Critical State Concern: Florida and the Model Code, 18 URB. L. ANN. 3
(1980) (description, of Florida's selective system of land development control); Rose, From the
Legislatures: State Government Role in Land Use Planning and Control is Growing, 2 REAL EST.
L.J. 809 (1974); Note, State Land Use Regulation Survey, supra note 39.
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982). The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) provides
technical and financial assistance to states with federally-approved coastal management programs.
For an analysis of CAMA in relation to CZMA, see Schoenbaum, supra note 38, at 279-83.
42. A "comprehensive plan" is defined as a "long-range policy guide for development of the
city [or region] as a whole;" it usually includes "a land use plan, a thoroughfare plan, a commu-
nity facilities plan and a public improvements plan," and often incorporates plans for conserva-
tion of natural resources, recreation, and community protection from fires, floods, or other
hazards. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 17 (1975).
43. Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 801-819 (McKinney 1982) [hereinafter
cited as APAA]. The courts have upheld the Adirondack plan despite a home-rule provision in
New York's Constitution. A home-rule provision gives local governments direct planning and
zoning authority; such a provision generally is recognized as stronger authority than the more
common alternative, a delegation of power from the legislature (enabling legislation). See
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977). In
Wambat Realty Corp. plaintiff's subdivision proposal was permitted by the local zoning board but
denied by the Adirondack Park Agency. Plaintiff challenged the Agency as an unconstitutional
suspension of the home-rule zoning and planning powers expressly granted to local governments
by the New York Constitution. The court denied relief after concluding that preservation of the
Adirondack Park was a substantial state concern not intended to be exempt from state control. Id.
See also D. HAGMAN, supra note 42, §§ 33-40; Note, Home Rule: Constitutionally Granted Planning
and Zoning Powers vs. State Concern for Preservation of the Adirondacks, 16 URB. L. ANN. 389,
392-93 (1979).
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:17 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983).
45. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 22,000-22,080 (Deering Supp. 1978) (commission es-
tablished to protect the Ventura-Los Angeles Mountain and Coastal Zone); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 24-65.1-101 to -65.1-502 (1982) (permits for development of areas of state interest and conduct
of activities of state interest); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 3301-3314 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1983)
(comprehensive plan for "human and physical resource development and utilization," capital im-
provements, and intergovernmental coordination planning, in addition to municipal planning
powers; state register of critical areas); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16G.01 to .14 (West 1979 & Cum.
Supp. 1983) (permits for development in critical areas); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 321.640 to .770 (1981)
(state assistance in critical area planning upon request of governor or local government); OR. REv.
STAT. § 197.005 to .850 (1983) (statewide directives, coordination, and review of local comprehen-
sive planning--special emphasis on critical areas); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.26 (West Cum. Supp.
1984]
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1971 Hawaii became the first state to enact a statewide system of land-use
control, requiring all land to be classified as urban, conservation, rural, or ag-
ricultural, with specific development and use limitations for each zone.46 The
Vermont legislature has divided the state into nine regions, establishing a com-
mission in each to ensure that proposed developments comply with state crite-
ria.47 Florida, on the other hand, has chosen a more selective statewide
system,48 requiring state oversight only in "areas of critical state concern" 49 or
over "developments of regional impact."'50 Florida followed the American
Law Institute Model Land Development Code, which operates on the premise
that most land-use decisions are of local significance and should be made lo-
cally;51 for the limited issues of significant state interest, however, the Model
Code recommends a combination of state and local policy-making and imple-
mentation.52 Unlike North Carolina's CAMA, however, the Model Code's
areas or developments of state interest may be located anywhere in the state,
not only in predesignated regions.
Although some may advocate a comprehensive, state-level mechanism for
protecting North Carolina's mountains and other sensitive areas to ensure that
local policies or inaction do not destroy areas of statewide importance, such
legislation undoubtedly would be opposed by others.53 An incremental ap-
proach designed to achieve the same result through piecemeal regional con-
trols might be the best approach to avoid these political barriers. One possible
1983) (shorelands protection combining state and local authority); Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-8-101 to -302
(1977) (statewide and local land-use planning with state assistance in critical area planning).
46. HAwAIi RFV. STAT. § 205 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1982). For an evaluation of Hawaii's
land-use control programs, see Lowry, Evaluating State Land Use Control- Perspectives and Ha wall
Case Study, 18 URB. L. ANN. 85 (1980). Lowry sets forth four arguments supporting a greater
state role in land development control: the insufficient sensitivity of local governments to the envi-
ronmental consequences of their actions; the statewide importance of resources such as coastal
wetlands and agricultural lands; the lack of attention to regional concerns resulting from fragmen-
tation of local authority; and the decreased vulnerability of state decisionmaking to local political
forces.
47. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6091 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1983). See D. MANDELKER,
supra note 39, ch. VII (features, process, and implications of Vermont's system).
48. FLA. STAT. § 380.05 to .06 (Cum. Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the two approaches to
state regulation of critical areas-regulation of a particular "geographic region legislatively desig-
nated on an ad hoc basis, and comprehensive statewide mechanisms for administrative designa-
tion and regulation of critical areas"--see Pelham, supra note 40, at 4-15. See also Finnell, Saving
Paradise: The Florida Environmental Landand Water Management Act of1972, 1973 URB. L. ANN.
103 (1973).
49. FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (Cum. Supp. 1983). "Critical areas" is commonly used to describe
areas for which preservation and protection is vital, usually for environmental or historical
reasons.
50. Id § 380.06. "Developments of Regional Impact" is used in the American Law Institute
Model Land Development Code to refer to a development that because of its "nature or magni-
tude ... or the nature or magnitude of its effect on the surrounding environment, is likely in the
judgment of the Agency to present issues of state or regional significance." MODEL LAND DEV.
CODE § 7-301(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
51. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE Article 7 comment at 285-86 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
52. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 7-101 note 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1975). The Model
Code recognizes the difficulty of defining in advance the matters that should be of state or regional
interest. For a critique of the Model Code, see D. MANDELKER, supra note 39, ch. III.
53. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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consequence of such legislation, however, would be a lack of uniformity or
cohesiveness.
The Ridge Law can be viewed as a necessary step in an incremental ap-
proach to statewide land-use controls. 54 Because it involves significant land-
use restrictions, however, it almost certainly will be challenged in the courts.
Plaintiffs can challenge the Act on a number of constitutional grounds. The
first of these is that the State may not reclaim powers it previously has granted
to localities. Second, opponents of the Act will argue that the State may not
selectively impose restrictions on its lands, because such restrictions are un-
constitutional local legislation. Third, opponents will argue that the aesthetic
controls imposed by the Ridge Law are not within the police power of the
State. 55 Fourth, opponents will argue that the restrictions imposed by the
Ridge Law constitute a "taking" of private property. Finally, nonresident
landowners will argue that, by restricting the use of their land without includ-
ing them in the referendum process, North Carolina has deprived them of
property without due process of law and has denied them equal protection of
the law.
To determine whether regional land-use controls imposed at the state
level are within the state's powers, the origin of the state's regulatory power
must be examined. North Carolina's Constitution provides that all local gov-
ernment powers are delegated by the State legislature.5 6 Nothing in the legis-
lation delegating planning and zoning powers, however, implies that the
powers granted are exclusively local, and, although regulatory power is not
expressly reserved by the State, several factors suggest that the State retains
concurrent power.
First, provisions in the enabling legislation imply that when county or city
land-use regulations conflict with other statutes or ordinances, the most restric-
tive law governs.57 The enabling legislation specifically refers to restrictions
on building heights,58 implying that statutes (state legislation)5 9 also might
regulate building heights.
54. See supra note 27.
55. For a recent analysis of aesthetic land-use control in North Carolina and elsewhere, see
Note, State v. Jones: Aesthetic Regulation - From Junkyards to Residences?, 61 N.C.L. REv. 942
(1983).
56. The North Carolina Constitution provides that:
The General Assembly shall provide for the organization and government and the
fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions,
and, except as otherwise prohibited by this Constitution, may give such powers and du-
ties to counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem
advisable.
N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1. Several state constitutions, such as New York's, delineate local powers
more specifically. See generally Note, supra note 43.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-346 (1983); id § 160A-390 (1982). These provisions are neces-
sary because of the conflicting jurisdiction of state, county, and municipal governments. The
Ridge Law follows the spirit of this law by providing for more restrictive local ordinances. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 113A-208 (1983).
58. Id. § 153A-346; 1d. § 160A-390.
59. "Statute" applies to acts of the national or state legislature, while "ordinance" refers to
municipal laws. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 1264, 989 (5th ed. 1979).
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Second, caselaw favors state reservation or reclamation of land-use con-
trol power. Although the North Carolina courts have not addressed this issue
in a land-use context, annexation cases and dicta in other cases suggest such a
reservation.60 "The authority of cities and towns as instrumentalities for the
administration of local government may be enlarged, abridged or withdrawn
at the will or pleasure of the legislature."' 6' This view-that states may abolish
or reclaim local government authority-also is accepted outside of North Car-
olina;62 both New York63 and Florida64 have upheld the primacy of state law
in a land-use context.
Finally, in determining whether the Ridge Law itself is a proper exercise
of the State's powers vis-a-vis local powers, one must note the State's limited
role under the Act. Local governments may avoid the state-imposed prohibi-
tions by rejecting the Act by referendum or by passing overriding ordinances
that satisfy state guidelines.65 In addition, counties may enact more stringent
60. Except when restricted by the Constitution, regulation of annexation by municipal corpo-
rations is within the state's legislative powers. Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 7,
269 S.E.2d 142, 147 (1980); Lutterloh v. City of Fayetteville, 149 N.C. 65, 69, 62 S.E. 758, 760
(1908); Abbot v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 74-75, 277 S.E.2d 820, 824 (1981).
61. Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 140, 52 S.E.2d 371, 376 (1949) (municipal
airport is a proprietary function ofgovernment for which the government is liable in tort); Town
of Murphy v. C.A. Webb & Co., 156 N.C. 402, 405, 72 S.E. 460, 461 (1911) (by act of state
legislature, town has right to issue bonds without a vote of the populace).
62. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). In this annexation case, the an-
nexed community was denied its challenge to the state-approved annexation. "The number, na-
ture and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State .... The State, therefore, at its
pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers ...." Id at 178. See also Bostic v. City of
West Columbia, 268 S.C. 386, 234 S.E.2d 224 (1977); State Theatre Co. v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 259
(S.D. 1979).
63. See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949
(1977) (Despite constitutional home-rule provision, New York's regulatory scheme for the
Adirondack mountain region involved matters of state concern, beyond "the property, affairs or
government of a local government," and therefore was within the State's power.)
64. See Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), afl'd, 372
So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978). In Cross Key Waterways Florida's statewide land-use development control
system was held to be within the state's constitutional powers. Particular standards and proce-
dures for identifying "areas of critical state concern" for which state administrative regulations
would supersede local controls, however, were found inadequate. The statute was amended to
correct this inadequacy. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05(2), amended by 1979 Fla. Laws 390, 392-99;
1981 Fla. Laws 1013, 1127. Recognizing the state-local authority, the court of appeals in Cross
Key Waterways stated:
The primacy of local government jurisdiction in land development regulation has tradi-
tionally been, in this country, a corollary of the people's right of access to government.
In a sense, therefore, the jurisdictional claim of local governments in these matters is
based on historical preferences stronger than law. Yet it is clear that counties and mu-
nicipalities . . . have no constitutionally vested jurisdiction in the regulation of the
"earth, water, and air" within their confines. The power exercised or withheld by those
governments is the state's power, appropriately delegated .... The jurisdiction of every
county, charter or non-charter, is subject to qualification by law.
251 So. 2d at 1065.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-208, -214(a) (1983). Despite these options, one may argue that
the time limits of the Act have precluded counties from avoiding the Act's restrictions. Sullivan
Interview, supra note 18. Compliance with the Act's requirement that counties pass overriding
ordinances by January 1, 1984 was nearly impossible since the final mapping by the State of areas
included under the Ridge Law was not due for completion until that date. Id As of the January
1, 1984 deadline, three counties, Avery, Henderson, and Watauga, had adopted ordinances more
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building height restrictions than the Act requires.66 The Act itself merely pro-
fesses to supplement other local regulation.
67
North Carolina's constitutional limitation on local or special legislation
also might threaten the Ridge Law.68 The North Carolina Constitution pro-
vides that "[t]he General Assembly shall not enact any local, private, or special
act or resolution: (a) Relating to health, sanitation, and abatement of nui-
sances; . . . [or] (j) Regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing. '69 It
could be argued that the Ridge Law is local legislation since it applies only to
a portion of the State. Furthermore, the Act can be characterized as relating to
health or nuisance abatement,70 or as regulating trade.
7 1
Assuming the Ridge Law does fall into one of the prohibited categories, it
is valid only if construed as a general rather than a local law. If it applies "to
fewer than all counties" and the restricted counties do "not rationally differ
from the excepted counties in relation to the purpose of the act,"' 72 the Ridge
Law is invalid. Thus, to satisfy the local legislation restriction of the North
restrictive than the state statute with two of these prohibiting virtually all structures taller than
forty feet. Raleigh News and Observer, Jan. 8, 1984, at 5D, col. 1. Only one county, Cherokee,
scheduled a referendum, for May 8, 1984, id., and the voters favored coverage under the Act by a
margin of 1926 to 535. Asheville Citizen, May 10, 1984, at 29, col. 1 (unofficial vote count).
Even if a county missed its opportunity to pass its own ordinance under the Ridge Law,
thereby making the State's restrictions operative, other enabling legislation permits a locality to
restrict building heights at any time. See supra note 18. If local ordinances are passed, the more
restictive law will govern. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-346 (1983) (counties); id § 160A-390 (1982)
(cities).
66. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-213 (1983).
68. For a thorough discussion of North Carolina's law concerning state "legislation minutely
regulating the affairs of individual local governments" see Ferrell, Local Legislation in the North
Carolina GeneralAssembly, 45 N.C.L. REv. 340 (1967). For a partial update on local legislation in
relation to CAMA, see Glenn, The Coastal Area Management Act in the Courts: A Preliminary
Analysis, 53 N.C.L. REv. 303, 306-14 (1974).
69. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24(1).
70. The legislative findings in the Ridge Law specifically mention the health hazards relating
to water and sewage, and the interference with air navigation. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 113A-207
(1983). For elaboration of what is and what is not included as health-related or nuisance-abating
legislation, see Glenn, supra note 68, at 307-10.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-207 (1983). Even though restriction of building heights only
indirectly regulates trade by infringing upon a developer's ability to build what he desires, both
indirect and direct regulation have been prohibited under the local legislation constitutional pro-
vision. See Glenn, supra note 68, at 308; see also Smith v. County of Mecklenburg, 280 N.C. 497,
187 S.E.2d 67 (1972) (statute authorizing referendum for liquor-by-the-drink in Mecklenburg
County held invalid as a local act).
72. Smith v. County of Mecklenburg, 280 N.C. 497, 507, 187 S.E.2d 67,73 (1972). In Adams
v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402
(1978), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the CAMA is not a "local act" since the
county distinction was made on a rational basis and was not underinclusive. The court considered
the legislative findings regarding the "unique, fragile and irreplaceable nature of the coastal zone"
and concluded that the CAMA addresses the "special and urgent environmental problems found
in the coastal zone." Id. at 691-93, 249 S.E.2d at 408. The court rejected plaintiff's, assertion that
the environmental problems of the mountains and the Piedmont also deserved legislative atten-
tion, concluding that it was "not a valid constitutional objection to the Act in light of [the court's]
finding that the coastal area is sufficiently unique to warrant specific legislative attention." Id. at
693, 249 S.E.2d at 408. Thus, the constitution does not require a regulation to reach every class to
which it might be applied, if it " 'strikes at the evil where it is felt and reaches the class of cases
where it most frequently occurs.'" Id. (quoting Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929)).
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Carolina Constitution, the Act must differentiate between counties with "pro-
tected mountain ridges" and those without "protected mountain ridges" on a
rational basis.
Although the Act does not expressly state its purpose, it commonly is con-
sidered aesthetic. 73 Since "local legislation" analysis does not consider the va-
lidity of the purpose74 but only the means imposed to achieve it, and mountain
beauty can be preserved only in mountain counties, the Act undoubtedly im-
poses a rational distinction for aesthetic purposes. If, however, the purpose of
the Ridge Law is not aesthetic-if the purpose is the prevention of hazardous
construction or the promotion of state land-use planning-a rational distinc-
tion would be more difficult to demonstrate. In holding CAMA constitutional,
the supreme court found CAMA's purpose of treating "the special and urgent
environmental problems found in the coastal zone" justifiably limited to the
coastal area.75 Although the environmental problems of the mountains are
less substantial, this decision illustrates the court's willingness to find a pur-
pose under which a classification may be justified. Considering the court's
history of deference to legislative actions, 76 the court should uphold the Ridge
Law against a local legislation claim.
The third potential constitutional claim that can be raised to challenge the
Ridge Law is that the Act constitutes a taking of private property without just
compensation.77 Since the Act prohibits the construction of tall buildings, it
73. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
74. For discussion of whether aesthetics is a valid purpose for state legislation, see infra notes
96-97 and accompanying text. In local legislation cases, the North Carolina courts tend to assume
that legislation affecting health or trade has a valid public purpose. Analysis of the local legisla-
tion issue instead emphasizes the rationality of the distinction between affected and nonaffected
localities. For a discussion of the North Carolina courts' treatment of local legislation, see Ferrell,
supra note 68, at 360-402.
75. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 693,
249 S.E.2d 402, 408 (1978). See supra note 72.
76. Invalidation of legislation as unconstitutional by North Carolina courts is limited to acts
that are "plainly and clearly" unconstitutional. Any reasonable doubts are resolved in the legisla-
ture's favor. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683,
689, 249 S.E.2d 402, 406 (1978); McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 119 S.E.2d 888 (1961); Glenn
v. Board of Educ., 210 N.C. 525, 187 S.E. 781 (1936). "In passing upon the constitutionality of a
legislative act it is not for this Court to judge its wisdom and expediency. These matters are the
province of the General Assembly." 4dams, 295 N.C. at 690, 249 S.E.2d at 406.
77. "No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S, CONST.
amend. V. The fifth amendment's prohibition of "taking" has been applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980);
Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). A "taking" claim is one of the traditional
challenges to land-use controls. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also Glenn, supra note 68, at 328-29; Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37-46 (1964).
Although no Ridge Law-type acts have been challenged on taking grounds, a few decisions of
other states have upheld regional land-use controls against taking challenges. Denial of a devel-
opment permit under the California Coastal Zone Act was not considered a taking, even though
permission for the development had been granted by a local government before passage of the
Act. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553
P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denie 429 U.S. 1083 (1977). The New York Adirondack
Park Agency Act's regional land-use restrictions, based on aesthetic, open space, and environmen-
tal considerations, were held not to be a taking of private property. Horizon Adirondack Corp. v.
State, 88 Misc. 2d 619, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1976). Similarly, a New York ordinance
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might prohibit property owners from fully exercising their property rights. Al-
though the right to develop property is considered a property right,78 it is well
settled that a mere diminution of the property's value or a partial restriction on
development will not invalidate an otherwise valid ordinance.79 In Responsi-
ble Citizens v. City ofAsheville8 ° the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
a land-use ordinance is invalid only if it deprives the landowner of all practi-
cal use of his property and leaves the property with no reasonable value, or if
it constitutes an unlawful exercise of the police power.81 This test requires an
ordinance to withstand both the literal taking test relating to deprivation of
property and a due process test to ensure the lawful exercise of the police
power 8
2
A law satisfies the taking component of the Responsible Citizens test if it
allows any practical use of the affected property or renders the property of
some reasonable value.83 In Responsible Citizens, an ordinance imposed cer-
tain specifications on new construction and mandated substantial improve-
ments on property located in a flood hazard district. The North Carolina
Supreme Court found no taking under the United States or North Carolina
constitutions since the existing use of the property was not affected and new
construction that satisfied the ordinance's flood damage prevention require-
requiring additional setbacks for riverfront buildings survived a taking challenge. In re Grinspan
v. Adirondack Park Agency, 106 Misc. 2d 501, 434 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
The result of a successful taking challenge would be either the repeal of the challenged law, a
payment for the value of the property taken, or a repeal with pro rata damages for the period of
deprivation. Inverse condemnation proceedings, in which a landowner sues to recover damages
for what has in fact been an uncompensated taking by a public entity, recently have been the
subject of controversy. California abolished this condemnation claim, concluding that invalida-
tion or amendment of the confiscatory regulation to restore the landowner's beneficial use of his
property is his exclusive remedy. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (1979), a/'don otherground, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), the United States Supreme Court avoided deciding whether de-
nial of an inverse condemnation proceeding is constitutional by dismissing the case for lack of a
determination by the lower court of whether a taking had occurred at all. A dissent by Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, and a concurrence by Justice Rehm-
quist, indicate that the Supreme Court would hold the denial of an inverse condemnation remedy
to be unconstitutional and require compensation for at least the period during which the confisca-
tory regulation was in effect. Id at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id at 653-60 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
78. "The term ['property'] is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest.
More specifically, ['property' has been defined as] ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right
to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude
everyone else from interfering with it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979). "Real
property" includes "[1]and, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to land."
Id. at 1096.
79. E.g., Penn Central Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409 (1915); Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 265,
302 S.E.2d 204, 210-11 (1983).
80. 308 N.C. 255, 302 S.E.2d 204 (1983).
81. Id. at 263-64, 302 S.E.2d at 209-10.
82. To determine whether a particular exercise of the police power is legitimate, a court will
use an "ends-means" analysis, determining, first, whether the purpose of the legislation is within
the scope of the power and, second, whether the method of achieving that object is reasonable. Id.
at 261, 302 S.E.2d at 208.
83. See id at 263-64, 302 S.E.2d at 210; Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 653, 122
S.E.2d 817, 822 (1961).
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ments was permitted.84 Citing the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,85 the court stated that no
taking occurs if an ordinance places "conditional affirmative duties on the
landowner to meet certain requirements if he or she wishes to engage in new
construction or alterations.
8 6
Thus, the Ridge Law taking issue is reduced to whether the denial of use
of a mountaintop landowner's property is so great as to deprive the landowner
of all practical use and reasonable value. Although this test necessarily is de-
pendent on the particular affected tract, a few general observations are helpful.
Although the Act prohibits construction of buildings taller than forty feet
within one hundred feet of certain mountaintops, 87 it does not prohibit all
construction; any property owner may construct a building less than forty feet
tall. Thus, no property owner can claim a complete denial of use.
Whether the remaining use is practical and of reasonable value depends
on several factors. If a particular locality passed an ordinance overriding the
state prohibition on tall buildings and enacting permit requirements, 88 the re-
sulting law would satisfy the Responsible Citizens test as prescribing "condi-
tional affirmative duties."89 If tall buildings are banned and a landowner can
demonstrate that the expense of constructing a low-rise building would be
higher than the expected use or revenue value, however, there might be a tak-
ing. The case would turn on issues of fact regarding construction expenses and
estimated value.
Although the Responsible Citizens taking language favors municipalities
and counties, the due process component raises more difficult issues, especially
if the Ridge Law's purpose is aesthetic. Although the taking test does not vary
with the purpose of the regulation, the due process test does vary. To deter-
mine whether the government's action constituted a due process violation, the
court in Responsible Citizens applied the same test applied in A-S-PAssociates
v. City ofRaleigh9° -whether the object of the legislation is within the scope of
the police power and whether, considering the surrounding circumstances and
particular facts, the means applied to achieve that object are reasonable. 91
The second part of this inquiry can be further refined to whether the statute in
its application is "reasonably necessary" to promote the accomplishment of a
public good and whether the interference with a landowner's right to use his
property is reasonable.
92
All of the stated purposes of the Ridge Law are within the scope of the
84. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 264-65, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
85. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
86. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-206(3), -206(6) (1983).
88. See id. § 113A-208.
89. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 267, 302 S.E.2d at 211.
90. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
91. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 261, 302 S.E.2d at 208; A-S-P Assocs., 298 N.C. at 214,
258 S.E.2d at 448-49.
92. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 261-62, 302 S.E.2d at 208; A-S-P Assocs., 298 N.C. at
214, 258 S.E.2d at 449.
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police power.93 If a court determines that safe construction was the Act's pur-
pose, it certainly would fall within the State's traditional power to regulate for
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the population.94 Similarly, if
the Act is found to exist for the economic purpose of preserving the mountain
economy, the Act is within the State's general welfare power. A combined
purpose of aesthetics and other considerations also would be within the police
power; in A-S-P Associates the purpose of a Raleigh ordinance creating a his-
toric overlay district was upheld as preserving educational, cultural, and eco-
nomic values as well as aesthetics. 95 Finally, even if the purpose of the Act is
deemed wholly aesthetic, it is valid under State v. Jones,96 a 1982 case in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that an ordinance
adopted solely for aesthetic purposes can be valid.
97
Although all the stated purposes are valid, the North Carolina "justifiable
means" test varies with the recognized purposes of a regulation; thus, it may
be more difficult to satisfy. At one point in A-S-P Associates, the court
adopted the two-pronged requirement that the statute as applied be "reason-
ably necessary to promote the accomplishment of a public good" and that its
"interference with owner's right to use his property as he deems appropriate
[be] reasonable in degree."98 At another point in the decision, however, the
court stated that determining reasonableness "necessarily involves a balancing
93. Regulation of land use traditionally has been acceptable, under the state's police powers,
for the promotion of public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare. See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
94. Generally, restrictions on building heights have been validated under the police power of
the state; it is no longer seriously disputed that for reasons of fire safety and circulation of air and
sunlight, a city may reasonably limit the height of its buildings. See infra note 113.
95. A-S-PAssocs., 298 N.C. at 216, 258 S.E.2d at 450.
96. 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
97. Until Jones, North Carolina courts, like those in many other states, believed that land-use
controls enacted solely for aesthetic purposes bore no relation to the state's police power or were
too subjective to apply without caprice. This attitude has been changing rapidly. See id. at 523-
30, 290 S.E.2d at 677-81; Note, supra note 55 (recent discussion of the history and implications of
Jones); Note, Leaving the Scene: Aesthetic Considerations in Act 250, 4 VT. L. REv. 163, 171-76
(1979) (concise treatment of police power as related to land-use controls for aesthetic purposes).
The United States Supreme Court never has expressly upheld land-use regulation solely for
aesthetic purposes. Dicta in several cases, however, suggest that the Court would uphold such
regulation. In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), an owner's action to enjoin a condemnation,
the Court recognized "the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled." Id. at 33. More recently, the Court called it "far too late to contend" that aesthetics is
not a "substantial governmental goal." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-
08 (1981). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, went so far as to say that under the major-
ity's decision in Berman "the aesthetic justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition
of billboards within a community . . ." Id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In another case,
although the permissibility of New York's objective in preserving structures and areas with cul-
tural, architectural, or historic significance was disputed; the Court referred to its recognition "in a
number of settings, that States or cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the
quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city." Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978).
98. A-S-P Assocs., 298 N.C. at 214, 258 S.E.2d at 448-49. The court applied this test and
found the means reasonable as the "only feasible manner in which the historic aspects of the
entire district can be maintained." Id. at 218, 258 S.E.2d at 450-51. Under the second prong the
court found it "most important" that the affected property owners were "not prohibited. . . from
erecting new structures." Id at 218, 258 S.E.2d at 451.
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of the diminution in value of an individual's property and the corresponding
gain to the public."99 These standards are not always compatible. Although
an ordinance might withstand the two-prong A-S-P Assoeiates test by promot-
ing its purpose in a rational manner without depriving the property owner of
the property's reasonable use, it could fail the stricter balancing test if the pub-
lic gain is small compared to the property owner's loss. In the two cases apply-
ing A-S-P Associates, Jones applies only the balancing test100 and Responsible
Citizens applies only the two-pronged test.10 1 Although these cases do not
state when each standard should be applied, they imply that in cases involving
aesthetic regulation the court will balance public gain and private loss,
l0 2
while in nonaesthethic regulation cases it will apply the two-pronged test.
The Ridge Law has both aesthetic and nonaesthetic purposes. Although
its original impetus and commonly accepted objective was the preservation of
mountain scenery' 03-an aesthetic purpose-the legislative findings and the
Act's probable effect imply additional objectives. Protection of structures from
high winds and destruction by fire were mentioned in the legislative find-
ings. t°4 Another potential nonaesthetic purpose is the positive effect of scenic
preservation on the region's economy. Although the Ridge Law's primary
purpose is debatable, aesthetic control is at least one of its purposes. Because
Jones characterized A-S-P Associates as applying the two-prong balancing test
and because the ordinance in A-S-P Associates was "not primarily concerned
with aesthetics,"' 105 the Ridge Law, whether or not primarily aesthetic regula-
tion, probably will be subject to the same balancing test.
In weighing the diminution in value of an individual's property, the court
in Jones stressed "whether the regulation results in confiscation of the most
substantial part of the value of the property or deprives the property owner of
the property's reasonable use."' 106 Compared to the Responsible Citizens tak-
ing standard,' 0 7 the Jones test requires a lesser showing of deprivation by the
property owner. Thus, even if the regulation cannot be shown to take all prac-
tical use and reasonable value, proof of the deprivation of reasonable use and
substantial value would be sufficient to constitute a violation of due process. If
the balancing test is applied faithfully, and the public benefit is determined to
99. Id at 218, 258 S.E.2d at 451. Although the court mentioned the balancing test, the court
did not apply the test in A-S-P Assocs.
This balancing test for determining whether a taking has occurred was first adopted in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and has been widely applied since. For a
discussion of the development and application of this test, see Glenn, supra note 68, at 327-33.
100. Jones, 305 N.C. at 530-31, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
101. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 261-62, 302 S.E.2d at 208.
102. The court in Jones characterized A-S-P Assocs. as applying the balancing test, even
though the purpose of the historical preservation law was not primarily aesthetic. Jones, 305 N.C.
at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
103. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 23.
105. Jones, 305 N.C. at 526, 290 S.E.2d at 678 (emphasis added).
106. Id at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 83.
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be minimal, even less than the deprivation of reasonable use and substantial
value could violate due process.
Because the Ridge Law does not prohibit construction at any location,
landowners will not face a complete deprivation of their property rights. 10 8 If
the high construction costs of low-rise buildings cause profits to be substan-
tially less than those that would be generated by a high-rise, however, and if
the court finds no other reasonable use of the property, the deprivation side of
the balance might be difficult to outweigh.
Under Jones, the public benefits to be weighed include the importance of
the legislation's purpose, the manner of regulation, and the "corollary benefits
to the general community such as protection of property values, promotion of
tourism, indirect protection of health and safety, preservation of the character
and integrity of the community, and promotion of the comfort, happiness, and
emotional stability of area residents." 109 Although an aesthetic purpose might
be entitled to less weight than the more traditional public purposes, the Ridge
Law also cites these other purposes. 10
The manner of regulation cannot be considered unreasonable; a moun-
tain view can be protected only by eliminating its obstruction. 1' With the
Ridge Law, the State has restricted construction without prohibiting all uses of
private property.112 In addition, the Act permits counties and cities to con-
sider their particular problems and needs to determine the best method of pro-
tecting their mountains. Finally, building height restrictions generally have
been considered reasonable. 113 Although building height restrictions rarely
have been justified on aesthetic grounds alone, the limited precedent should
be of little consequence since both the purpose and method of aesthetic regula-
tion are widely recognized.
Some of the benefits inherent in preserving the mountain scenery are of
the kind envisioned in Jones.14 In an area that depends heavily on its scenic
beauty,' 15 preservation of the community's character and integrity is the most
substantial benefit. As evidenced by the general outrage over the construction
108. See supra text accompanying note 87.
109. Jones, 305 N.C. at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
110. The application of the balancing test to aesthetic regulation and the two-pronged reason-
ableness test to laws passed for other purposes suggests that North Carolina courts may be more
willing to validate regulations enacted for traditional health and safety purposes. See supra notes
98-102 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 98.
112. Id.
113. SeeWelch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). Seegeneraly, D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNING-
HAM, supra note 40, at 399-415; Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 963 (1949) (summary of cases validating build-
ing height restrictions).
114. See supra text accompanying note 109.
115. North Carolina's mountain region is "noted across the nation as a recreational area;"
tourism is "basic to the regional economy." In the seven-county region with Asheville as its
center, "local residents accounted for only a fraction of the $1.3 billion recorded in retail sales [in
1980]. A large portion of those sales were generated by the hundreds of thousands of tourists who
visit the region every year." Urban Institute & Dept. of Geography and Earth Sciences, Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Charlotte, Land of Sky Urban Center: An Economic Atlas 5 (1983).
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of Sugar Top, 16 regulation of such "eyesores" promotes the comfort and hap-
piness of local residents. The effect on tourism, however, is debatable. Some
assert that allowing unrestricted development would have increased the poten-
tial flow of tourists to an area the economy of which is largely dependent on
tourism;" 7 others contend that allowing uncontrolled development would
have decreased tourism by ruining the area's dominant attraction, its moun-
tain scenery.' Is Because the relative merits of both contentions are debatable,
the courts should defer to the judgment of the legislature,.19
Thus, the due process balancing test, like the taking test, depends on "the
facts and circumstances of each case."' 20 Given the important public pur-
poses of preserving mountain scenery, allaying the safety concerns of moun-
tain residents and vacationers, and preserving the region's economic base, and
the reasonable means and corollary benefits of the Ridge Law, private loss
would have to be substantial to prove a due process violation, even under the
less burdensome balancing test.
A final constitutional challenge to the Act might be the allegation by a
nonresident landowner that procedural due process has been violated' 2' by
depriving him of a property interest without notice or an opportunity to de-
fend.' 22 Since the Ridge Law was enacted without representation of out-of-
state landowners, and procedures for passing overriding ordinances or refer-
enda do not include this class of landowner,123 nonresidents arguably are de-
nied due process. Because the Ridge Law may lead to three possible
legislative outcomes, each resulting from a different governmental proce-
dure, 124 the procedural due process claims against each will be considered
separately.
Under the first scenario, the state-legislated ban on tall buildings is effec-
116. See generally Winston-Salem J., supra note 12; Fayetteville Observer, supra note 4; Char-
lotte Observer, supra note 2.
117. See Charlotte Observer, supra note 2. It could be argued that since unregulated develop-
ment is cheaper and easier for developers, construction would continue at a rapid pace, creating a
large supply of tourist opportunities. This large supply would keep vacation prices low, attracting
more tourists. Controls on development, under this argument, would make development so ex-
pensive that little would occur, the low supply of vacation opportunities, together with the high
demand, would make vacations prohibitively expensive for most tourists.
118. See Durham Sun, supra note 3; Charlotte Observer, Supra note 2.
119. SeeA-S-PAssoc., 298 N.C. at 226, 258 S.E.2d at 449.
120. Jones, 305 N.C. at 531, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
121. Under the United States Constitution, this claim would be based on the proposition that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The comparable language in the North Carolina Constitution is that
"[n]o person shall be ... in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of
the land." N.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 19. "Law of the land" is synonymous with the federal constitu-
tion's "due process of law" clause. In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 98, 221 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1976).
Due process traditionally has been a ground for challenging land-use regulation in North
Carolina. See, e.g., Jones; A-S-P 4ssocs.; State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320, appeal
dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
122. See, e.g., Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974).
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ I13A-208, -214 (1983).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
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tive because no local government action is taken. 125 Although an out-of-state
landowner might try to argue that his constitutional rights have been denied
since he is not represented in the legislature, it is well-established that the no-
tice and hearing requirements of procedural due process do not apply to legis-
lative actions. 126 Rather, the rights arise only when the government is acting
on matters not of general concern, but in an adjudicatory capacity. 127 Because
land-use regulation traditionally has been enacted by the legislative branch
and affects a large group of citizens, designation of the Ridge Law as legisla-
tive undoubtedly is appropriate; in a land-use context, only individual actions
such as conditional use or subdivision permits have been considered adjudica-
tory. 128 Thus, a procedural due process claim against the state-imposed ban
would fail.
The second Ridge Law scenario involves an overriding local government
ordinance regulating tall buildings by requiring permits. 129 Although this
type of regulation traditionally is considered a legislative action,130 the statute
specifically requires a public hearing before passage of an ordinance.131 Even
if not constitutionally mandated, a public hearing is statutorily required and
arguably must comply with a due process test.
If due process is to be accorded the out-of-state property owner, the notifi-
cation procedure must be "reasonably calculated, under all of the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action." 132 North
Carolina courts, however, are hesitant to override legislative judgment where a
"constitutionally adequate" means of notice has been prescribed by statute.133
The Ridge Law requires that a public hearing for consideration of an ordi-
nance be advertised in a newspaper of general circulation throughout the af-
fected area at least ten days prior to the hearing. 134 Because the North
Carolina Supreme Court has upheld a similar provision in the context of both
a local zoning amendment and a municipal annexation procedure, 135 it also
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-209 (1983).
126. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). "The constitution does not
require all public acts be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes
within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to
the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard." Id. See also Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (annexation is a political question for the legislature); Texfi Indus.
v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 7, 269 S.E.2d 142, 147 (1980) (annexation is legislative issue).
127. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
128. See, e.g., Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1420 n.16 (4th Cir. 1983) (self-classi-
fication by county council of action as "legislative" would not be binding on court if action is
usually adjudicatory); Horn v. Ventura County, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718
(1979) (subdivision approval was adjudicatory function; other planning decisions less extensive
than rezoning, such as conditional use permits, are not insulated from due process requirements).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-208 (1983).
130. Most states grant the power to enact ordinances regulating building heights to municipal
or county governments. See, e.g., supra note 18.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-208(f) (1983).
132. Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 9, 269 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1980).
133. Id. at 9-10, 269 S.E.2d at 148.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § l13A-208(f) (1983).
135. See Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 9-10, 269 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1980)
(annexation notice requirement upheld); Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817
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would uphold the Ridge Law's notice requirement as being "constitutionally
adequate." Thus, even if the hearing is presumed to be adjudicatory, a due
process challenge will stand only if the statutory provisions are not followed
by the county or municipality.
In the third scenario, a local government, by referendum, elects to escape
Ridge Law coverage altogether.' 36 A nonresident landowner might argue
that, since the Act provides for a referendum of only registered voters,1 37 he
has been deprived of his opportunity to be heard.13 8 Not only are nonresident
landowners prohibited from voting on the referendum, they may not sign a
petition calling for a referendum.' 3 9 Thus, the outside landowner is denied a
voice in the referendum procedure.
In North Carolina voting rights attach to an individual's place of resi-
dence. Residence is defined as that place "in which [an individual's] habita-
tion is fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of
returning."1 40 Thus, because a person may have only one residence at any
given time,14 it can be assumed that neither a nonresident property owner nor
a part-year resident, even though directly affected by the Ridge Law, will
qualify to vote in a Ridge Law referendum. 142 Although these parties may
(1961) (statute requiring published notice "once a week for two successive calendar weeks in a
newspaper published in such municipality" valid against due process challenge). Since Tex In.
dus., however, North Carolina's annexation laws have been amended to require mailed notice of
the public hearing to all property owners within the area to be annexed. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 160A-49 (Supp. 1983).
136. 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 181 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-214 (1983)).
137. Id.
138. In a California case, this argument was sustained in a similar situation. See Taschner v.
City Council of Laguna Beach, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 65-66, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214, 228 (1973) (city
height ordinance enacted by initiative and subsequent vote, without notice to or hearing for all
affected property owners, held to violate due process). The holding in Taschner, however, was
overruled in Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 597, 557 P.2d 473,
480-81, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976) (notice and hearing provisions do not apply to ordinance
enacted by initiative).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-214(a) (1983) ("The binding referendum shall be held either as
a result of a resolution passed by the governing body of the jurisdiction or as a result of an initia-
five petition signed by fifteen percent (15%) of the registered voters in the jurisdiction. . ....
Because nonresidents may not register to vote, they may not sign an initiative petition.
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-57(l) (1982). "Residence" is the same as "domicile" under North
Carolina voting law. Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972);
State ex rel Owens v. Chaplin, 228 N.C. 705, 47 S.E.2d 12 (1948).
141. If a person intends to change his residence or votes elsewhere, the law considers that
person to have abandoned residence in the original county or state. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-57(4),
(6) (1982).
142. If one temporarily changes residence with intentions of returning, such as a part-year
resident, he does not lose his original residency. Id § 163-57(2). A part-year resident could argue,
however, that each home is his part-year residence and that he therefore should be entitled to re-
register and vote in each place while residing there. Frequent reregistration may be possible if
residency can be shown, since durational residency requirements have been held to violate the
equal protection clause. See, eg., Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971), afd, 405
U.S. 1034 (1972).
A nonresident, by definition, does not qualify to vote. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-57 (1982)
(suggesting that residency is the sole criterion for voter registration). The Ridge Law, however,
includes as a "resident" of a county any person "doing business or maintaining an office" within
the county, id § 113A-206(2) (1983), creating an apparent inconsistency with the voting statutes.
The Ridge Law's definition of "resident," however, probably was intended to afford property
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have other opportunities to voice their opinions, 143 the denial of the right to
vote appears to be a flagrant due process violation. Nevertheless, since this
type of deprivation affects a class of citizens rather than a particular individ-
ual, it generally has been challenged under the equal protection clause, rather
than the due process clause.
To assert an equal protection challenge, a plaintiff must prove that the
challenged law creates a distinction between two groups of citizens that is not
rationally related to the law's purpose. Normally, a rational relation between
the classification and the purpose is sufficient to withstand a constitutional
challenge. 144 When a fundamental right or a suspect class is concerned, how-
ever, the government must prove that the distinction is necessary to a compel-
ling state interest.145 Whether the rational basis or the compelling state
interest (strict scrutiny) test is applied often determines the outcome of the
case. 146
The first question in the equal protection analysis is whether nonresident
property owners' rights to vote in municipal special elections affecting their
property are fundamental. Although the right to vote has been characterized
as a fundamental right, 14 7 its efficacy in a particular situation "requires con-
sideration of the facts and circumstances behind the challenged law, the inter-
est which the state claims to be protecting, and the interest of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification."'
148
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether nonresident
property owners may be excluded from participation in a municipal referen-
dum affecting their property; the Court, however, has recognized that the right
to vote may not be a fundamental right of nonresidents, even though it is
fundamental for residents. The Court has determined that the right to partici-
pate in the political process may be limited to those who live within the munic-
ipal borders. 14 9 In its most recent related case, Holt Civic Club v. City of
owners standing to challenge actions taken pursuant to a Ridge Law ordinance rather than stand-
ing to vote in a referendum. The referendum provision refers to "registered voters" and not to
"residents." Id. § 113A-214.
143. Nothing precludes part-year residents, nonresident landowners, or developers from "lob-
bying," conducting educational campaigns, or even initiating an initiative petition to call for a
referendum. Additionally, there is an opportunity to be heard in the public hearings that are
required before passage of an ordinance under the Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-208(f) (1983).
Finally, one "doing business or maintaining an office within a county," as a "resident" under the
Act, may challenge an ordinance as not in compliance with the Act. Id at §4 113A-206(2),
-208(g).
144. See Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980).
145. Id.
146. For a complete equal protection analysis of municipal voting rights cases, see Note, State
Restrictions on Municipal Elections: An Equal Protection Analysis, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1491, 1492
(1980).
147. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
148. Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 12, 269 S.E.2d 142, 150 (1980).
149. See, eg., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). For a catalog of the leading cases on equal protection and voting
rights in North Carolina, see Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 435-40, 251 S.E.2d 843, 856-59 (1979)
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Tuscaloosa,150 the Court applied the rational basis test to a state law subjecting
residents of a small unincorporated community to the neighboring city's police
and sanitary regulations and criminal jurisdiction without permitting the resi-
dents to participate in the city's political processes.' 5 ' The Court concluded
that the statute was reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose.
No decision of this Court has extended the "one man, one vote"
principle to individuals residing beyond the geographic confines of
the governmental entity concerned, be it the State or its political sub-
divisions. On the contrary, our cases have uniformly recognized that
a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in
its political processes to those who reside within its borders.'
52
Although the Court did not say that it never would extend the right to vote to
nonresidents, its strong language suggests this result. Furthermore, the cases
considered by the Court generally have involved nonresidents immediately
outside its borders. Given its refusal to extend voting rights to these neighbor-
ing nonresidents, the Court undoubtedly would be unwilling to extend voting
rights to more distant property owners.
In Holt the Court stated that, in certain special interest elections, a state
may restrict voting rights within the community to residents with the requisite
special interest.'53 Thus, it might be argued that the state also may extend
voting rights to specially interested nonresidents. The Court, however, did not
suggest that a state must extend such rights.
The rationale for permitting residency restrictions was stated in Dunn v.
Blumstein,'54 an earlier case in which the Court applied a strict scrutiny test.
The Court invalidated a Tennessee statute requiring a person to live in the
state for one year and in the county of registration for three months before he
could vote. Although the Court struck down this duration requirement, it
stated that a "uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be
necessary to preserve the basic conception of apolitical community, and there-
fore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny."' 55 Because the dictum in-
dicates that such a residency requirement would withstand even a strict
scrutiny test, the question of which test to apply is insignificant. Thus, since
these cases recognize the longstanding validity of residency requirements even
(no denial of equal protection to presume that student who leaves home to go to college is not
domiciled in place of college; but presumption rebutted by showing of intent to make college
community home, at least while in school, and of no intent to return to parents' home).
The Court has upheld voting schemes giving weighted votes or limiting the right to vote to
property owners, when the elections involved special government districts, with limited powers,
that disproportionately affected property owners. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). For a discussion of the validity of limiting voting rights
to property owners, see DeYoung, Governing SpeciaiDistricts: The Conflict Between Voting Rig/ts
and Property Privileges, 1982 ARiz. ST. LJ. 
419, 430-52.
150. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
151. Id at 70-71.
152. Id. at 68-69.
153. Id at 69.
154. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
155. Id at 343-44 (emphasis added).
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under strict scrutiny, only exceptional circumstances would invalidate such a
requirement.
Several North Carolina cases have recognized that the right of nonresi-
dents to vote in a referendum is not fundamental, and therefore have sub-
jected voting restrictions against interested nonresidents only to the rational
basis test. In Thompson v. Whitley,156 plaintiffs challenged the North Carolina
annexation statutes under which municipalities with less than five thousand
residents could annex adjacent areas without a vote of the residents to be an-
nexed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Car-
olina rejected plaintiffs' claim that the fundamental right to vote required a
"compelling state interest" for the distinction to be valid. 157 The court, stating
that the right to vote in a referendum does not relate directly to the fundamen-
tal right to participate in representative government, applied the rational basis
test.15 8 Two later annexation cases also applied a rational basis test to hold
that annexation without consent does not violate the equal protection
clause.' 59 Although the annexation issue arguably is different from the issues
involved in interpreting the Ridge Law, these annexation cases illustrate the
courts' inclination toward upholding the validity of legislative action .in the
voting rights area.
Although the United States Supreme Court and the North Carolina
courts have not addressed whether a rational basis or strict scrutiny test should
be applied to the Ridge Law's referendum provision, the Colorado Supreme
Court has answered this question in a situation similar to the Ridge Law. In
Millis v. Board of County Commissioners of Larimer Countyt60 the court upheld
a statute allowing in-state nonresident property owners to vote on referenda
creating and delineating the powers of a special water district, but denying the
right to out-of-state nonresident property owners.161 The court applied the
rational basis test and concluded that the equal protection claim was without
merit. Because Colorado residents were more likely to be concerned about the
environment, urban development, and an adequate water supply in Colorado,
they were entitled to a greater voice in the district. 162
In light of the applicable judicial decisions regarding equal protection, the
156. 344 F. Supp. 480 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
157. Id. at 483-84.
158. Id.
159. In re Annexation Ordinance #D-21927 Adopted by City of Winston-Salem, N.C., De-
cember 17, 1979-AREA I, 303 N.C. 220, 278 S.E.2d 224 (1981); Texfi Indus. v. City of Fayette-
ville, 301 N.C. 1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980) (right of corporation to vote in annexation proceeding
affecting corporation's property not fundamental, since voting rights historically applied only to
individuals; annexation law withstands rational basis test).
160. 626 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1981).
161. "The fact that a nonresident owns land in this state does not create a fundamental right to
political participation in decisions which affect that land." Id. at 658.
162. Id The court referred to an earlier unreported case in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, Millis v. High Drive Water Dist., No. 75-M-1021 (D. Colo. Jan. 18,
1978), aft'd mer., 439 U.S. 802 (1978), which validated the ordinance under the United States
Constitution. Id Millis v. Board of County Comm'rs came to the same conclusion under the Colo-
rado Constitution.
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voting rights of nonresident property owners would not be deemed fundamen-
tal. The Ridge Law referendum does not relate directly to participation in
representative government any more than annexation. Nor are the interests of
nonresident property owners "necessary to preserve the basic conception of a
political community;"' 63 they often run counter to the best interests of the
community. The Ridge Law, for instance, was passed in response to outside
property owners' activities that directly conflicted with the local residents' val-
ues.164 To allow nonresident property owners to vote would threaten the in-
terests that the law was intended to protect and directly contradict the
rationale underlying residence requirements as stated in Dunn.
Further, although a referendum may exempt the area from any restric-
tions on tall buildings, a result beneficial to the development rights of property
owners, the result of a failure to "opt-out" would not be any more restrictive
than would enactment of the Ridge Law without a referendum. Thus, the
effects of denying nonresidents the vote are no harsher than the effects of de-
nying all citizens the right to vote. Additionally, there are no restrictions on
the nonresidents' opportunities to lobby for their position during the referen-
dum process; thus, there is no complete denial of the right to be heard. In light
of Holt, Millis, and the North Carolina annexation cases, it is apparent that
North Carolina would apply the rational basis test.
Appliction of the rational basis test requires a determination of whether
the Ridge Law's distinction between residents and nonresidents is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. Given the legitimate purpose of
protecting the natural beauty of the mountains, 65 it might be argued, as in
Millis, that residents of the area have a greater interest in protecting the area's
natural resources and thus are entitled to preferential treatment. 166 Since Mil-
lis deemed it rational to distinguish between classes of nonresident property
owners, it would be even more rational to distingush between residents and
nonresidents. Also, given the dictum in Dunn that residency requirements
have long been upheld and would pass a strict scrutiny test, 167 the Ridge
Law's referendum process certainly would survive the more lenient rational
basis scrutiny.
In conclusion, it is likely that the Ridge Law will withstand the constitu-
tional challenges discussed in this Note unless the particular facts are extreme.
The Ridge Law's impact, however, could be either immense or negligible. It
may signal a trend toward state aesthetic land-use controls. Although previ-
ous state land-use controls have been targeted at environmental concerns,' 68
the Ridge Law is the first to go beyond these concerns to regulate aesthetic
interests. While the limited state-imposed controls may have been the only
163. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343-44.
164. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
166. Millis, 626 P.2d at 658.
167. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 38-39, 75-76 and accompanying text. CAMA was passed primarily as an
environmental protection act.
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politically feasible approach because of public sentiment against regulation,169
the public may become more receptive to land-use regulation as it adapts to
the restrictions. By designating the entire mountain region as an area of cru-
cial state concern, the state could extend development standards to al parts of
the region. Alternatively, with state-level regulation of both the coastal and
mountain regions, the State may decide to pass legislation allowing for the
designation of critical areas anywhere in North Carolina.170 This would elim-
inate the allegations that coastal and mountain regulation is local legislation
and give the State more flexibility to intervene in other areas of state concern.
Passage of the Ridge Law, however, is more likely an isolated event, rem-
edying a genuine concern of area residents and landowners. Although one
county held a referendum, and three others passed ordinances more stringent
than the state-prescibed standards, the localities appear satisfied with the effect
of the Ridge Law, wanting no more and no less intervention.' 7 1 Thus, it ap-
pears that more stringent state-level controls would not be either politically
advisable, likely, or fair unless it can be demonstrated that the problems of the
mountain counties have more than local significance. Although CAMA was
justifiable because of environmental effects beyond the immediate area, the
case for state intervention in the mountain region is more difficult. Even
though tourism is increasingly important to North Carolina's economy, and
the economic development of the mountain region might justify more state
intervention, the Ridge Law's effects on the region's economy will have to be
determined before any such intervention occurs.
The Mountain Ridge Protection Act is a positive step toward controlling
mountain area development. Because of the highly political nature of state-
local relations, however, the inherent limitations of the Ridge Law, and the
traditional antiregulation sentiment of the region's residents, the Act's impact
as a catalyst for more comprehensive state land development controls will not
be great.
ROBERT M. KESSLER
169. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
170. This legislation might be like that of other states, notably Florida. See supra notes 48-52
and accompanying text.
171. Raleigh News and Observer, supra note 65. Watauga, Avery, and Henderson counties
adopted ordinances stricter than the State law. Id The voters of Cherokee County, in a referen-
dum on May 8, 1984, opted for inclusion under the Ridge Law. Asheville Citizen, supra note 65.
1984]
